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’Funmi Olonisakin, Alagaw Ababu Kifle and Alfred Muteru 
 
Evolution of ideas of peace 
The pursuit of sustainable peace has been an integral feature of intellectual and 
practical engagement across centuries – from the period of the classical 
philosophers to the age of enlightenment and across the 19th and 20th centuries. The 
founder of social contract theory, Thomas Hobbes, perceived war as the natural 
state and hence peace has to be crafted through a social contract establishing a 
sovereign whose power is ‘absolute, omnicompetent, indivisible and ultimate’.1 And 
thus peace is maintained by taming human nature and creating structures that 
reduce the structural dilemma, call it security dilemma, arising from the absence of 
overarching authority. In the International realm this served as a base for the realist 
school of International Relations.2 His successor, John Locke, set his theory on a 
different notion of the social contract and by extension the reasons for the 
establishment and legitimacy of political authority. Starting on the assumption that 
the state of nature is characterized by the enjoyment of, though not secure, right to 
life, liberty and property, Locke squarely put peace and order on limited 
government that securely protects the aforementioned rights.3 Finally, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau introduced the idea of the General Will that serves the genuine interest of 
every member; allows its member live under the force of law; grants them 
freedoms.4  
Most prominent, in the evolution of the idea of peace, perhaps has been the 
development from the idea of perpetual peace outlined by Immanuel Kant that 
emphasised the centrality of states and social compact with citizens,5 to Johan 
Galtung’s notion of negative peace, which he constructed as “absence of violence, 
absence of war” and of positive peace, which he first defined as ‘integration of 
human society’ and later as ‘social justice’.6 In the last two decades, peace has been 
most prominently conceived of as an ideal form of “Liberal peace” sometimes 
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understood today as process of post-conflict intervention and a move from peace to 
peacebuilding.7 
The trajectories of these narratives have no doubt been shaped by the nature 
of the debates of the times in which they emerged. Kant was responding to the 
conditions of times in which maintaining a Wesphalian peace was paramount. How 
to achieve “eternal” peace through the ending of wars between sovereigns occupied 
Kant’s attention at the turn of the 18th Century. For Kant, maintaining continuous 
peace between states went beyond a truce but required a permanent end to 
hostilities. This was possible only if peace treaties were reached without parties 
harbouring ‘mental reservations about issues which would be confronted later’.8 
Thus, entering into a peace treaty simply because parties were too exhausted to 
continue with war would be an act of “bad faith” and could not be considered peace 
but a mere suspension of hostilities.9 Attaining perpetual peace by permanently 
ending war between states would also require the end of annexing of independent 
states; and an abolition of standing armies.10 
Embedded in Kant’s notion of peace however is the view that a republican 
system offers the best prospect for perpetual peace. Since war is inevitable in the 
state of nature, a state of perpetual peace must be created – first by people and then 
by the states that they create. To do so, it must be citizens through their inalienable 
natural rights as human beings, equal beings, who create a set of laws – a republican 
constitution to which they all subscribe and which forms the basis for governing the 
state. In short, such a state should be the product of conversations among its people, 
the whole of society. As such, the decision to wage a war is taken by the collective of 
citizens in a society. Were this to be so, they would proceed cautiously while 
ruminating over the costs of waging a war. The situation is different in democracies 
that are not “republican”. Subjects, as opposed to citizens, do not get to decide 
whether or not to go to war. That decision is firmly in the hand of the ruler(s), who 
can often afford to act arbitrarily. Ultimately, a ‘federation of free states’ would 
determine the law of nations, which invariably holds the possibility of perpetual 
peace.11 
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There are clear and mutually reinforcing intersections between the Kantian 
ideal of perpetual peace and the notion of peace advanced by Galtung more than a 
century and a half later. To be certain, Kant was concerned about the nature of the 
society that would ultimately ensure perpetual peace between states but the 
permanent prevention of war between states was a major preoccupation. Galtungs’s 
idea of peace understood peace as the absence of war – more specifically the 
absence of violence. But that violence was not about physical violence. In his 
seminal piece on Violence, Peace and Peace Research in 1969, Galtung offered a 
distinction between personal and direct violence, and structural and indirect 
violence.12 The absence of the first produces negative peace, while the absence of the 
latter produces positive peace.13 For Galtung: 
 
With the distinction between personal and structural violence as 
basic, violence becomes two-sided, and so does peace conceived as the 
absence of violence. An extended concept of violence leads to an 
extended concept of peace. Just as a coin has two sides: absence of 
personal violence, and absence of structural violence. We shall refer to 
this as negative peace and positive peace respectively.14 
 
Galtung was clear that this is violence, which does not cause direct physical 
harm. Rather it is built into the structure, ‘shows up as unequal power and 
consequently as unequal life chances’.15 As such, this pursuit of a frame for stable 
peace in society is consistent with Kant’s own search for perpetual peace. An 
egalitarian society invariably breeds peaceful co-existence and stability and a 
potential visioning of a common future. Arguably, societies that achieve this would 
invariably reflect deeply on the issue of conflict with other societies.  
Much of the ideals advanced by Kant and later by Galtung, remains a work in 
progress. To be sure, the annexation of states is arguably a thing of the past among 
Western democracies. Wars of aggression are a rarity today in inter-state relations 
even outside of Western democracies. This is notwithstanding the reversals 
experienced from time to time. Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait in 1991, which was 
 5 
repelled by a global coalition and Russia’s more recent annexation of Crimea, which 
saw a timid response from the international community are cases in point. Standing 
armies have remained a core feature of states. The reality of a nuclear arms race in a 
post-WW II period, the accompanying danger of nuclear annihilation; and a fiercely 
fought Cold War between the great powers, were not conducive to the idea of states 
without armies. Neither the ‘federation of free states’ nor a world of republican 
systems has been realised in the vast majority of states of which those in Africa are 
still evolving. Nor is this realisable under existing global conditions in a post-Cold 
War world. Progress has nonetheless been realised in patches. War between states 
is reduced but remain a feature outside of Western democracies. Violent conflicts 
remain a reality in many societies. 
 
Evolving narratives and recent developments in peacebuilding 
As the incidents of violent and armed conflict have continued to evolve in the 
period since the end of the Cold War, ideas of peace and how to build peace in places 
experiencing the outbreak of violence has been a preoccupation of academic and 
policy communities alike. The shift in the nature of threats to international peace 
and security was inevitable in a changed post-Cold War dispensation. Outbreaks of 
violent intra-state conflicts in the period since 1990 and the resultant humanitarian 
tragedy in a number of conflict situations in former Yugoslavia and Africa – Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia and Rwanda among others – drew global attention to the need 
to find peaceful resolution. Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace in 1992,16 and its 
sequel in 1995 were a result of the UN’s attempt to find a framework for bringing 
about stable peace in armed conflict situations in Africa and other regions where the 
sheer magnitude of human suffering provoked global outcry. 
Implementation of the Agenda for Peace created fertile ground for the 
evolution of ideas of liberal peace. Boutros-Ghali’s initial conceptualisation of 
peacebuilding in Agenda for Peace reflected a sequential approach and at the same 
time served to build a consensus around the concept of “liberal peace.” Returning 
war-affected societies to stable peace would entail a multi-level effort to build 
 6 
governance from local to international levels through preventive diplomacy, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement.17 
On the surface, the idea of liberal peace is not inconsistent with the earlier 
Kantian ideal or indeed, Galtung’s notion of absence of violence and social injustice. 
Oliver Richmond, in the Transformations of Peace, breaks down the constituent 
parts of the liberal peace theory into the following – democratisation, human rights, 
civil society, rule of law and liberalisation most visibly reflected in free market 
reform and development – what Richmond refers to as the ‘technology of the liberal 
peacebuilding process’.18 While it is difficult to dispute a claim for people to have 
equal rights in a society where the rule of law prevails this has evolved into a 
template for building particular types of states. The notion of liberal peace has 
therefore become the framework by which the international community seeks to 
bring peace to war-affected societies.  
Roger Macginty and Oliver Richmond analyse four main threads of ‘evolved 
thinking’ on peace and peacebuilding – victor’s peace, institutional peace, 
constitutional peace and civil peace – which they sum up into the ‘conservative’ and 
‘orthodox’ models of liberal peace.19 The conservative model consists of ‘top down’ 
approaches to peacebuilding and it is underlined by practices of coercion, 
domination and hegemony.20 The orthodox model of state building, on the other 
hand is sensitive to ‘local ownership’ in the building of liberal institutions although 
still inherently top down. It projects peace ‘as being state led… representing top 
down and bottom up at the same time… with emphasis on the former.’21 It is not 
inconsistent with the conservative model as it sees the provision of security as a 
starting point and proceeds to undertake peacebuilding ‘based on international 
assumption of technical superiority over its subjects via the claim of normative 
universality of the liberal peace’.22 The bottom up approach, which places emphasis 
on social justice, is its added value.  
Thus, the sooner one begins to talk about peace building the sooner one slips 
into discussion of state-building, and the sooner one ventures to talk about peace 
the sooner one runs into the idea of the state. This is not problematic in and of itself. 
The problem is that the idea of the state one has is a particular kind of state so 
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detached from the context in which one is talking about peace. That social order 
requires some sort of governance arrangement is not questionable, but to state that 
social order needs to be based on a liberal state in situations where a liberal order is 
neither feasible nor probably desirable (at least from the viewpoint of actors at the 
domestic level) is at best misleading.  
 
State-building as peacebuilding  
This “backdoor” entry of state-building into the peacebuilding discourse 
introduces a complexity. The nature of liberal peace that is used to reconstitute 
states after conflict in the post-Cold War world is essentially a one-size-fits-all 
paradigm that is used to bring peace and democracy to war-affected societies. On 
the surface, the idea of supporting societies where conflict has degenerated into 
violence, to pursue their nation building and state-building efforts seems logical.  
But the assumption that one template will suit all conflict situations is faulty at best. 
This is compounded by the fact that contemporary approaches in peacebuilding 
have largely focused on “packaging” efforts meant to transition post-conflict states 
from war to peace and based on itemised “pillars” and “timelines” to be achieved in 
a specific timeframe.23 This has come to characterise institutional approaches of the 
United Nations and its partners. Rather than an approach, which facilitates a return, 
(although not guaranteed) to the non-violent pursuit of the state and/or nation 
building conversations, which degenerated to violence, the need to end violence 
becomes an end in itself. Ultimately, what is achievable under such circumstances is 
negative peace and not positive peace. 
This approach – of state-building as peacebuilding – is no doubt informed by 
the idea that states that experience armed conflict are inherently weak. 
Contemporary ideas of state-building have not only been predominantly founded on 
European experiences,24 but they have since the end of the Cold War and post 9/11 
terror attacks in the United States, gone through a conceptual and pragmatic 
evolution by adopting aphoristic concepts such as “collapsed states”, to their 
subsequent corollaries, “failed state” and “weak states”.25 Equally today, “liberal 
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peace” sets a standard by which “failed states” and “bad civil societies” are judged 
according to ethical, spatial and temporal markers.26 
The basis, though theoretical, of state-building as peacebuilding, is founded 
on two central tenets. First is the state’s capability to perform functions or the 
ability to achieve specific outcomes. The two functions and outcomes, which are 
important to highlight here are usually founded and advanced on a Weberian 
philosophy of coercive and non-coercive functions of the state.27  The coercive 
functions are considered as the state’s capacity to successfully and legitimately 
monopolise the means of violence and thus possess the capability to enforce 
extractive functions such as revenue collection, taxation or exploiting resources, 
maintain law and order, and provision of security within a given territory.28 The 
non-coercive functions, mainly characteristic of modern states, are described in 
terms of the state’s provision of social goods and services, the durability and efficacy 
of a state’s governance structures and its social and economic redistributive 
functions.29 
          These concepts are widely held with reference to ideas of state-building in 
Africa both in theory as well as in practice.30 The premise therefore is that, a state 
that performs these functions is considered successful while those that are unable to 
perform them are failed. The implication of this is that when violent conflict occurs 
in a state that is deemed to have “failed”, the solution to that conflict must of 
necessity be found in constructing this ideal state. This approach to building peace 
has gained prominence in the last two decades. In this regard, state-building is thus 
often constructed as a prerequisite to peace. To be certain, this logic is not entirely 
unfounded. The assumption that the state was neither well-constructed nor based 
on the recognised paradigm might lead one to conclude that if only a particular type 
of state was built, a peaceful order would prevail.  
The challenge however lies in the fact that a particular kind of state, namely a 
liberal state, is proposed as offering the potential for lasting peace particularly in 
contexts of armed conflict. Liberal states cannot be built as conceived by liberal 
state builders and even the most sophisticated attempts at doing so ends up 
building a state that remotely resembles a liberal state. Such an approach ignores 
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the path, time, sequences of events and processes (which are path dependent) taken 
by liberal states to acquire their current form. It simply aims to build such states by 
crafting ‘liberal-like institutions’ that are supposed to embody liberal values which 
in the end brings ‘liberal-like states’ with ‘liberal-like values’ that are actually far 
from how a liberal state actually behaves. How these kinds of institutions come 
about bring us back to the notion of conversation, which is discussed later.  
There have been inter-elite and elite-society and elite-outsiders 
conversations and these are segmented and fragmented, reinforcing and 
contradicting institutions with all their complexity. The way situations unfold in 
practice, thus, reveals these complex and context specific paths that cannot be 
viewed because of the dominance of the ‘liberal way of seeing’ that assesses state 
and peace building experience in terms of becoming more or less of the liberal 
variant (they are not qualitatively different whatsoever). However, shifting the 
analytical lens may increase the visibility of alternative ways of looking at actual 
state and peace building practices that would potentially give rise to a different 
approach to peace and state building by local and international actors and hence the 
need to approach the subject from a different perspective.  
The second basis of the state-building as peacebuilding orientation is the 
resurgence of theories of conflict that emphasise the opportunity structure of 
violence and the lack of state capacity as a determining factor of conflict across the 
world. Often based on econometric analysis, these studies associate conflict 
primarily in terms of the human, financial and organizational feasibility of rebellion, 
which among others, is determined by the availability of exploitable resources, the 
existence of large pool of illiterate youth, and weakness of the state. Work by Collier 
and Hoefller,31 and Fearon and Laitin,32 among many others, demonstrated the 
centrality of state-building for peacebuilding, which later informed policy making 
ranging from the extraction and trading of natural resources exploited from conflict 
affected countries to IFI`s policies towards conflict affected countries. Using the 
proxies of rebels` access to finance, the cost of rebel recruitment, and governments’ 
military capability Collier and Hoefller argued that the phenomenon of civil war is 
largely explained by the greed motive. Similarly, Fearon and Laitin argued that civil 
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wars are largely explained by factors favouring rebellion that are found in 
financially and bureaucratically weak states. The logical response to this entails 
strengthening the capacity of the state and delivery of services so as to reduce the 
opportunity cost of rebellion and increase the states capacity to deter rebellion and 
deliver services. 
An apparent trend, not unconnected with the points noted above, is that this 
evolving analysis of state-building on the basis of the functions and outcomes 
described above does not limit itself to only war-affected situations. Rather, part of 
this analysis lends itself to the possibility of state-building even in non- or pre-
armed conflict situations. One area, for example, which would be true for pre- and 
post – armed conflict situations is that of resource extraction. One of the themes not 
keenly emphasised in the extractive element of the state is taxation.33 Although 
interveners recognise the impacts of longstanding aid reduction on government 
capacity to generate revenue, writers have not adequately elaborated at what point 
international development partners should withdraw support to post-conflict 
countries. Consequently, the solutions, therefore prescribed by policymakers have 
been hasty institutional reforms, building state capacities. Furthermore, the main 
challenge identified in these reforms is that donor programmes tend to be conceived 
with “do no harm” assumptions, which presume that African countries are trapped 
in perpetual institutional failure hence, they require more aid support.34 
The main argument is that, in post-conflict countries, a functional public 
financial system that is, the capacity of the state to collect and expend revenue, is 
not only essential for state making but also peacebuilding. However, studies of a 
number of African countries indicate that taxation goes beyond collecting revenue. 
The main concerns lie in the social contract between the taxpayers and the state; 
that is tax compliance is related to state provision of services including security.35 
Successes therefore of the state in revenue extraction and, ultimately successes in 
statebuilding, are imperative on the state advancement of the social contract, which 
depends on how it negotiates with the society in revenue raising among other 
things.36 Imperatively rather than emphasise a donor-driven process of assisting 
developing states to build a tax regime, it is essential to build on the willingness of 
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the society to pay taxes and the role played by taxation in state-society bargaining as 
well as the creating stimulus taxation that provides the capacity of the state to 
develop other sectors. This argument resonates with the central idea in this study 
that the nature of internal conversations between leaders and peoples determines 
the path to a viable, peaceful state. 
 
The notion of “conversation” as the missing piece in the peacebuilding discourse 
The centrality of inter-elite and elite-society conversation in the course of 
building sustainable and peaceful states means that the conventional assumptions 
linking peace building and state-building need to be problematized. The mainstream 
literature, especially but by no means exclusively in post conflict contexts, depict 
statebuilding as the solution to and part of the process of peacebuilding, and to this 
end advocates building a particular kind of state that inevitably leads to a particular 
kind of peace. While this literature, on certain occasions, acknowledge the 
possibility of tension and parallelism between the two,37 in its contemporary 
incarnation, it dominantly sees peacebuilding in terms of crafting and 
institutionalizing architectures of peace. Rarely does it present peacebuilding as a 
separate agenda from which institutions upholding it (the state) evolve except 
adding certain issues of consideration in the course of ending war, which includes 
themes such as DDR and transitional justice and reconciliation.38   
Even the most systematic assessment of the peacebuilding enterprise going 
on so far focuses on dynamics of democratization and marketization and end up 
recommending institutionalization before democratization.39 Though this argument 
is neither problematic nor unsound in the face of dominant practices of 
peacebuilding, it overlooks the deeper issues involved in the process of 
institutionalization at the core of which is the difficulty to chart a non-violent inter-
elite and elite society conversation and without which institutionalization will be 
shallow. It underestimates the fact that ultimately institutionalization (later 
research took the spirit of this point to mean state building)40 is centrally all about 
the messy political processes involved in inter-elite and inter-society conversation 
and that peacebuilding entails shifting such conversations in non-violent directions.  
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This shift in the framing of peacebuilding and state-building endeavours, we 
hope, balances the tendency to privilege the technical over the political, and 
remedies the shortcomings of policy measures emanating from such biases. It also 
brings certain concepts and themes to the fore while relegating others to the 
background. Issues relating to political settlement, nation building, political and 
economic community, conversation, and legitimacy are some of the issues this 
reframing brings to the fore. This study focuses on political settlement and 
conversation and their interconnection with the praxis of peace and state-building. 
In doing so, we aim to shift the debate from a focus on which institutions, liberal or 
otherwise, and/or which policies are most effective for peace to how inter-elite and 
society-elite conversation give rise to or fail to bring a particular ensembles of 
institutions and policy outcomes, and demonstrate the role of political settlement in 
shaping the nature and outcome these conversations. 
Accordingly, this research aims to reframe the state-building–peacebuilding 
problematique by re-centring the notion of conversation in the processes of building 
peace and state. It argues that peacebuilding conversations are not only about 
building peace but also are essentially about the normative and institutional 
underpinning of the peace (whatever its type) and hence state-building. While not 
wanting to invite the “chicken and egg” kind of debate, we argue that state 
institutions would be embedded in society if and only if they are a product of prior 
conversation about peace and social order among elites and between elites and 
society, and that non-violent conversation tends to usher durable peace and 
patterns of governance. This, we believe, would serve as an alternative way of 
approaching the state building-peacebuilding problematique, of course, with a 
caution or two. First, there had been violent conversations that ended up in 
consolidating state institutions though this is not likely in the contemporary period.  
Second, once emerged out of violent or non-violent conversations institutions in 
turn shape the kind of conversation a society is to have, and the kind of peace or war 
that follows from it (hence the process is essentially path dependent limiting the 
relevance of one-size-fits-all, template-based approach to peace and state-building). 
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This reframing of orientation brings the notion of political settlement to the centre 
of the debate in the state-building and peacebuilding endeavour.  
                  Conventionally, as noted above, the enigmas involved in state and peace 
building often lumped under the notion ‘building a peaceful state’ is approached 
through privileging state building as the key to lasting peace. In this process, the 
task of interveners would be building the coercive and non-coercive functions of the 
state, and this privileges the technical over the political no matter what level of 
attention and caution is foretold regarding the importance of the latter. These 
functions are not assumed to be based on a certain underpinning conversation as 
they are rather assumed to shape the form a conversation would take and hence 
political settlement understood in its broader sense as power balance and 
intermediation/conversation among different groups, classes, actors in society has 
little relevance.  
           Stated starkly, in the liberal approach to peace, a particular ensemble of 
institutions leads to peace whereas we argue inter-elite and elite society 
conversation, on some conditions, leads to certain institutions rooted in society, 
meaning that legitimate institutions which are products of and under which lies a 
particular kind of peace (the property of which cannot be stated before the fact). 
One fruitful label of these ensembles of institutions and their underpinning 
normative order would probably be hybrid state and peace. Given the global 
dominance of liberal actors, and structures supporting that ideology the kind of 
institutional/governance arrangement inter-elite and elite society conversation will 
give rise to will be hybrid one that combine liberal elements (to accommodate the 
leverage of liberal actor and their ideology) with local notion of what constitute 
legitimate governance and legitimate actors.  
This forces us not to define what state-building and peacebuilding entails in 
advance. The only point we can make is that state-building entails supporting and 
facilitating conversation that leads to a legitimate set of institutions and 
strengthening the effectiveness of existing institutions governing the collective life 
of the society through supporting inter-elite and societal conversation as deemed 
appropriate. And peacebuilding entails facilitating conversations that minimize 
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what a society (not external peace builders) considers as violent, and building what 
a society inter-subjectively agreed to be peace. Hence, building peace is all about 
charting conversation among contending actors in non-violent ways, and that the 
end of that is not simply how war is to be ended and peace restored. It is also about 
the transformation of normative and institutional pillars that follows from charting 
such conversation. Needless to say, the notion of political settlement both in its 
broader and narrow conception becomes a relevant tool of analysis for such an 
approach. 
 
The notion of Political Settlement and its role in peace and state building 
The concept of political settlement has its origin in historical political 
economy,41 and has different meaning and analytical utility for development 
oriented scholarship and conflict studies. In much of the literature on development, 
political settlement is understood as the basic, implicit and explicit, rules ordering 
society and economy in a state which often end and prevent conflict and hence its 
linkage with war and peace. It is the extent the institutionally regulated distribution 
of rights is compatible with societal power balances, and results in sustainable 
economic and political outcomes.42 Institutional structures that allocate benefits and 
burdens disfavouring powerful groups do not generate sustained economic and 
political outcome and hence unstable. DFID defined political settlement as ‘the 
deeper, often unarticulated, understandings between elites that bring about the 
conditions to end conflict, but which also in most states prevent violent conflict from 
occurring’.43 According to this perspective, a peace agreement can be part of a 
political settlement though the latter is not reducible to the former.  
A victorious party could impose a political settlement. An imposed 
settlement develops when a defeated party renounces war as an option to advance 
political demands either because it has a chance to engage in politics through 
election, or because it believes that violence is not a viable means to achieve its 
goal.44 This perspective accepts that political settlements are not static and that 
there could be violent changes of government while the settlements remain intact. 
The concept also refers to agreement among elites on the basic rules of the political 
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game governing the exercise of political power to serve their best interests and 
beliefs in the political organization of the state45. The nature of elite bargain is 
essential for understanding trajectories of state failure and resilience. Political 
settlements that are inclusive of all major elite groups and that link political power 
with economic interests tend to be durable, whereas those that are exclusionary are 
likely to be fragile and vulnerable to failure.46 However, the inclusiveness of a 
political settlement should not be judged by looking at the participation in the 
bargaining process or official appointment. The distribution of entitlements and 
rights to various groups and classes is the main determinant of the level of 
inclusiveness of a settlement.47  
The OECD paper entitled From Power Struggles to Sustainable Peace: 
Understanding Political Settlements, understands political settlement as an event 
and a process. As an event, it entails the historical and political processes that 
culminate in a peace agreement and/or the transition from an old political order to 
a new order, and, as a process, it is envisioned as a specific condition or property of 
society.48 Every political system, except those that are in the midst of civil wars, has 
its own underpinning political settlement and hence political settlement, as 
employed by OECD, does not necessarily mean the forging of full-fledged consensus. 
The OECD underscores that the concept could serve as a conceptual bridge between 
the twin processes of peacebuilding and state-building though it falls short of stating 
the mechanism that links the two processes49. The event dimension of a political 
settlement is essential to end violence, whereas this starting point is assumed to 
substantially affect the subsequent trajectories of state-building. 
                The problem of such understanding of political settlement relates to the 
counters of the concept. There is the risk of it becoming a “catch-all” concept that 
potentially includes a broad range of issues. This limits the analytical utility of the 
concept as it would be difficult to disentangle the effect of different variables on 
political settlement and the extent a given political settlement affects other variables 
of interest. This is further complicated by the difficulties of identifying observable 
elements of the concept. While some point out the lack of political settlement by the 
prevalence of widespread violence others contend that governments might be 
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changed violently while the settlement remains intact. Hence, the analytical utility of 
the concept is impaired by contentions over its nature, conceptual boundary and 
observable implications. 
The literature on peace and conflict studies uses political settlement to refer 
to either war termination of any type or negotiated settlement of civil wars only. 
Understood as ways of terminating wars, three different types of political 
settlements are identified in the literature: victory based settlement, negotiated 
settlement, and ceasefire/stalemate.50 While victory based settlement refers to a 
situation where one side is declared winner and the other admits defeat and 
surrenders, negotiated settlement refers to a situation where each side agrees to 
end violence and devise a common framework for post-war governance. Ceasefire is 
an ending of a war without a common agreed framework for post-war governance. 
Hartzell and Hoddie added a fourth way of ending war where one party negotiates 
with an outside third party that is part of the conflict as when the Sri Lankan 
government negotiated with the Indian government to end the war with the Tamil 
separation movement51. Kreutz also added a fourth type under the category of other 
outcomes, which includes civil wars that end just because rebels decided to end the 
conflict without any reciprocal action on the part of the government.52 For di John 
and Putzel this understanding of the term political settlement is ‘theoretically 
unattractive’.53 However, scholars interested in war termination have advanced 
insightful theoretical arguments about war termination and the possibilities of 
durable peace54.  
           This study understands political settlement as an activity or decisive action 
that marks the end of armed conflict or a transition from violent conflict to the 
pursuit of conflict by non-violent means. This decisive moment embodies, implicitly 
or explicitly, the terms under which conflicting parties would live together 
regardless of the extent to which these terms are consensual or imposed. Every 
political order, however dictatorial, always depends on some sort of acceptance, as 
there always is the possibility to subvert imposition from above no matter how 
grave the consequences might be. Thus, this helps us to discern not only the 
processes through which terms of shared lives or/and agreement come about but 
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also the substantive content of the arrangement by which contending groups live 
together. We do not presume, at the outset, that such an arrangement would be 
procedurally and substantively better in negotiated settlement than victory based 
ones. The only point we wish to emphasise is that such an arrangement, drawing 
from Khan,55 is supported by the power balance among contending actors external 
influence being accounted for.  
Nonetheless, understood as the decisive event marking the end of armed 
conflict and the introduction of a new political order, political settlement does not 
simply refer to the way war terminates but also the changes in the warring actors 
and their relationship during the course of the termination. This refers to changes in 
the organizational, ideological and mobilization capacity and will of warring actors, 
the inclusiveness of the actors and/or processes ushering in the termination, and 
the level of consensus in the arrangement by means of which a transitioning society 
is going to live together. This understanding is informed by the assumption that the 
end of civil war is not only about the end of armed activity but also is about change 
in a range of organizational and political dynamics. Understood this way, our 
definition combines elements that simultaneously exclude and include, compare and 
contrast the two types of settlements. By this, we mean, first, settlements based on 
victory are presented to be qualitatively different from settlement based on 
negotiation and in this sense we want to compare processes giving rise to that 
decisive moment marking a transition to another form of order and the extent this 
shapes consequent processes of conversations, violent or otherwise, about peace 
and state building. We use the notion of conversation here to refer to implicit and 
explicit interaction and dialogues among collectivises or their elected or self-
proclaimed agents pertaining to issues of central concern for the groups or part 
thereof.  
            The normative, institutional and organizational form these conversations are 
manifested in and are materialized through is an essential aspect of the process that 
set countries on different trajectories to peace and state building. At one level, they 
are the manifestation of these conversations and at another level they are the 
medium through which these conversations are materialized. In other words, once 
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in existence they shape the kind of conversation to be had and they manifest the 
kind of conversation that had been going on. Arrangements that institutionalized a 
particular form of governance (ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, devolution in Kenya, 
justice management in Rwanda, resource governance in Sierra Leone), for instance, 
indicate the kind of conversation that was central before and during the settlement 
and at the same time shapes the subsequent conversations to be had.  
               Driven by this logic, we imagine, a particular settlement sets the context 
about what is possible, imaginable and practicable, and what is not a thinkable 
course of action given the (perceived) power balance among contending actors. In 
other words, while it facilitates certain courses of actions, it inhibits others. It also 
determines which actors are legitimate, to what extent and to take which course of 
actions (either due to the leverage they command or their past conduct), as well as 
which actors are not legitimate to engage in the peacebuilding and state-building 
enterprise. Hence, we presume that different settlements would have different 
peacebuilding and state-building ramifications, and the extent different settlements 
determine the consequent peace building and state-building dynamics in different 
countries is part of the insight that we seek to gain from this study. 
             Second, by including processes of changes in organizational, relational and 
political dynamics in the course of the way war terminates, our definition also 
includes elements that dilute this stark difference and binary juxtaposition of 
victories based and negotiated settlements. As a transition from war to peace or 
from one form of conversation to the other, they both exhibit features that mark 
such a transition. By including this aspect, we are in a sense arguing that perhaps 
there is not that much difference between the two types of settlements as both 
ultimately embody the central issues involved in all transition from one form of 
social order to the other and that the difference might be a matter of degree than 
substance. Even when significant difference is observed regarding their ramification 
on peace and state building it might be the result of a specific aspect of a settlement. 
Some features so common in one form of transition may be present in another form 
to a lower degree. This not only helps us to approach the issue from a totally 
different angle but also helps us to particularize each settlement. By this, we mean, 
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one form of victory-based settlement may display so-close-a-resemblance with 
another form of negotiated-settlement than the resemblance it would exhibit with 
another form of victory-based settlement.  
               The rationale for this assumption hinges on the well-studied fact that war 
and conflict situations are so complex given the contradictory processes and forces 
are at work. There is peace, cooperation and even common norms (which is why the 
law of war existed!) and norms guiding combatants behaviour in wars not involving 
the state, like norms repudiating the killing of vulnerable including women, children 
and elderly in inter communal conflicts) in war and as war and violence in peace.56 
Likewise, there is negotiation in victory and victory in negotiation and this 
ultimately renders the difference between the two not as stark as one expects it to 
be.57 Thus, while our first definition captures the discontinuous aspect of change by 
viewing settlements as decisive moments or as ruptures, our further specification 
captures processes that constitute the continuous and incremental aspects of 
change entailed by a transition process that eventually culminates in a process 
qualitatively different from the processes preceding and giving rise to it. 
The specific changes war-to-peace transition entails, as noted above, includes 
the extent the process is more or less inclusive or exclusive, the extent there has 
been change in organizational, ideological and mobilising strategies, and the extent 
they are terminated in a consensual or imposed way. The process marking the end 
of the conflict could be seen in terms of the inclusive-exclusive continuum both in 
terms of being replica of society and in the sense of including contending actors. A 
settlement may include major armed powers or some of them or non-at all, and it 
may exclude armed actors but include non-armed ones and vice-versa. We 
preliminarily propose that negotiated settlements tend to include major warring 
parties but exclude societal groups and hence they are more likely to remain inter-
elite bargain. Contending elites would have no pressure to include grassroots civil 
society once they are able sort out their own differences. And thus state-building 
and peacebuilding conversations in these countries are more likely to revolve 
around issues that are central for the elite than the society at large. Election, number 
of state institutions, distribution of political offices, for instance, might be central 
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areas of conversation whereas improved livelihood, poverty reduction, health 
coverage, and sanitation might not be that important.  
We also argue that imposed settlements would be more exclusionary of 
contending elites while being inclusionary of societal groups. Once one of the 
warring party is de-capacitated, there still would be discontent within the 
constituency of the vanquished group the victorious party needs to take into 
account. Hence, this may necessitate forming alliance with the people while blaming 
or even punishing the elites for the societal wreck brought about by the war. In such 
settlements we expect conversation to revolve around intra-elite bargain and issues 
essential to penetrate and frame the thoughts of societal group in a way the victories 
party desires while remnants of excluded actors aim to reintroduce issues of central 
importance to them. We also submit that the inclusionary-exclusionary momentum 
will be affected by the level of external interest in the settlement and hence the 
leverage external powers exert in the process of transition from war to peace. We 
presume this exclusionary-inclusionary momentum will affect the terms of the 
settlement and subsequent processes of peace building and state-building in a 
complex ways.   
Transition from war to peace or simply from one type of order to the other 
also entails change in the mobilising capacity of contenders and the will to do so. 
The extents of change in these variables depend on the nature of the transition 
process. The transition might be brought about in such a way that the capacity of 
one or some of the contenders is so weakened that they cannot imagine and hence 
did not revert to such courses of action. Or it might be brought about in such a way 
that one or more of the contenders motive to mobilize for war is felt to be addressed 
or taken into account and hence do not need to do so. Hence, while they have their 
goal intact, they may go through a transformation of their tactics. At other levels 
they may totally shift their ideology in response to the changed circumstances. All of 
these affect post-war peace and state building through their effect on opportunity 
for violence and on motives of violence. 
              Organizational reformation or the merging of different organizations and 
personnel in the security apparatus is another apparent trend in war to peace 
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transition. Two extremes can be identified in this regard: one, the warring parties’ 
security apparatus is merged together; and two, one of the warring party retain its 
organization intact while the other part(ies) organization structure dismantled. In 
the latter case the ordinary combatants will be either demobilized and reintegrated 
or reoriented to join part in the winning part`s organizational structure submitting 
to its norms and organizational chain of command. These two are the extremes: in 
actual case the majority of cases would fall in between. We further assume that this 
has implication for post-war peace and state reconstitution by affecting the 
opportunity structure of violence/ feasibility of violence.   
                Finally, it needs to be acknowledged that the structural context within 
which the settlement is arrived at has determining effect on peace and state building 
trajectories. The level of economic growth, the quality of distribution, the political 
history of the nation, its geopolitical (ir)relevance are all factors that shape the 
nature of the settlement and processes of peace and state building. 
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